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The Future of Online Privacy: A Proposal
for International Legislation
I. INTRODUCTION
A revolution in data exchange and data processing has led to
the creation of a new, popular forum for communication called
Cyberspace.1 Cyberspace is maintained through the Internet,
which is an "internationally linked system of computer networks
on which data flows."' 2 Today, the Internet plays an important role
in social and economic life, and therefore, concerns over online
privacy have become a major issue for the millions of people who
use the Internet daily.
Recently, both the United States and the European Union
have addressed privacy concerns with regard to the Internet. In the
United States, "much of current computer privacy law is found in
laws [and statutes] ... targeting specific records for regulation.,
3
In contrast to the U.S.'s diverse and targeted approach, the
EU has a more common omnibus approach. The EU has worked
to create comprehensive privacy regulations regarding controls
over the collection and use of personal data transferred over the
Internet.4 In 1995, the European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union adopted the Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data (EU Directive), designed to
protect the privacy of personal data and increase the security of
data flow among the fifteen member states.5
The United States is concerned that the EU Directive
prohibits online data transfer between its fifteen member states
1. RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 389 (West Group 2d ed. 1999).
2. Id.
3. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 1, at 429.
4. See HARRY HENDERSON, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 57 (Facts on File
Inc. 1999).
5. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
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and other countries that do not provide adequate privacy
protection.6 While the concept of privacy is deeply ingrained in
American tradition and the U.S. Constitution, enforcement of
privacy rights in the United States is fragmented and much weaker
than privacy laws in most European nations. In 2000, in response
to the fact that the EU Directive could potentially interrupt
transfers of personal information between Europe and the United
States, the U.S. Department of Commerce developed a safe
harbor framework that allows U.S. organizations to satisfy the EU
Directive's requirements while ensuring that personal data flowing
to the United States would continue uninterrupted
In creating the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (Safe Harbor),
the U.S. Department of Commerce wanted to bridge the
differences between the EU and U.S. approaches to privacy
protection while simultaneously ensurin adequate protection for
the personal information of EU citizens. The standards contained
within the Safe Harbor do not sufficiently remedy global, and
more specifically, the EU's concerns about the adequacy of private
data protection. Today, there is debate between the United States
and the EU about what constitutes adequate protection.
This Comment will discuss why the current U.S. approach to
privacy protection is insufficient, and will propose a new
international model of privacy data protection legislation which
satisfies both EU and U.S. concerns. Part II presents a background
on the current approaches taken by the EU and United States in
addressing the issue of personal data privacy. It will also examine
the privacy guidelines set forth by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Council of
Europe Convention, both of which served as a model and basis for
the EU Directive and the Safe Harbor. Part III analyzes
arguments for and against an omnibus legislative response in
addressing privacy concerns, and discusses the unavailing nature of
current U.S. self-regulatory schemes. Finally, Part IV proposes a
new international model for privacy protection legislation, and
discusses how this type of overreaching international legislation
can be successfully implemented and enforced.
6. Id. art. 25.
7. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW, available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last visited April 2, 2004).
8. See id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The OECD and the Council of Europe
The OECD "is an international organization that promotes
economic and social welfare" 9 by supporting progressive efforts on
behalf of developing nations. The United States is a member of
this organization. ° In the late 1970s, the OECD started creating
guidelines for data protection, and in the 1980s, it adopted the
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data (OECD Guidelines)."
The OECD Guidelines are "based on the general principle of
fair information practices,"" and apply to both automated and
non-automated processing of personal data.3  The OECD
Guidelines did not create binding law upon any of its signatories,
including the United States.
The Council of the European Union works to promote a
greater degree of collaboration among the democratic states of
Europe. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Council was already
reviewing questions about the effects of technology and privacy. In
February 1980, the Council promulgated the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regfard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data (the Convention).' For the most part, the content
of the Convention was similar to that of the OECD Guidelines.
Unlike its U.S. counterpart, however, the Convention placed more
emphasis on the "importance of data protection to protect
personal privacy,""a and it was legally binding on the member
9. Robert Gellman, Conflict and Overlap in Privacy Regulations: National,
International and Private, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE
GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 255, 264 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds.,
Harvard College 1997).
10. Id.
11. OECD, Council Recommendation Concerning Guidelines Governing the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (September 23, 1980),
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981) [hereinafter OECD 1980].
12. Gellman, supra note 9, at 265.
13. See id.
14. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Council of Europe, Eur. T.S. No. 108
[hereinafter 1981 Convention].
15. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 34 (Brookings Institution
Press 1997).
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states that joined.16 The Convention, which took effect in 1985, was
only ratified by some of the twenty-nine member states. 7
Although both the OECD Guidelines and the Convention
share similarities, having been developed at approximately the
same time and with similar motivation, there are nevertheless
significant differences in the scope and application of the OECD
Guidelines and the Convention.
First, the OECD Guidelines apply to both automated and
non-automated processing of personal data, whereas the
Convention is limited only to the automated processing of data.
8
Second, just as the name implies, the OECD Guidelines are
recommendations and not legally binding to countries that have
signed on. The Convention, on the other hand, is legally binding to
the countries that have ratified it. 9 Neither the OECD Guidelines
nor the Convention specifies details on practical application of the
established standards, and both contain only very general
provisions on how to enforce those standards. Therefore, neither
the OECD Guidelines nor the Convention can be considered a
sufficient model of international privacy data legislation.
B. The EU Approach to Online Data Protection
European institutions are at the forefront of data protection
rules and policies. European privacy legislation reflects the
apparent "consensus within Europe that privacy is a fundamental
human right which few if any other rights equal.",2' The
amalgamation of these concerns led to the adoption of the EU
Directive in October 1995.22 While much of the EU Directive is
based on the 1981 Council of Europe Convention and the 1980
OECD Guidelines, in many areas the Directive goes further.
23
16. See 1981 Convention, supra note 14, at 319.
17. PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 24
(Brookings Institution Press 1998).
18. See OECD 1980, supra note 11, 34-36.
19. See OECD 1980, supra note 11, at 422.
20. Gellman, supra note 9, at 265.
21. CATE, supra note 15, at 48.
22. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 5.
23. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW:
STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A HIGH TECH AND CHANGING REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT 181 (Practising Law Institute 2002).
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The EU Directive contains a complex set of rights,
restrictions, and exemptions, which are not found in the OECD
Guidelines or the Convention. The expressed intention of the EU
Directive is twofold: (1) to ensure uniform levels of protection
between EU member states "to remove any obstacles to the free
flow of personal data 24 between the fifteen member states; and (2)
to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals,
"notably the right to privacy. " 25
First, in terms of scope, the EU Directive applies to the
processing of all personal data, subject to exemptions found in
Article 3. Article 3 of the Directive exempts from regulation the
processing of "public security, defense, State security, and criminal
law activities of the State," as well as data processed by a natural
person "in the course of a purely personal or household activity.""
Second, under Article 4, each member state is required to apply
the national provisions it adopts where: (1) the controller is
located on the territory of the member state; (2) the controller is
located where the national law of the member state applies; or (3)
processing equipment is situated on the territory of the member
state, unless the use of such equipment is transitory. Third,
Article 6 lays out the Principles of Data Quality, which limits the
collection of data to "specified, explicit and legitimate purposes,"
prohibiting the processing of data if it is incompatible with those
purposes. Furthermore, data must be "adequate and, where
necessary, kept up to date."2 9 Reasonable steps must be taken to
ensure that inadequate data is "erased or rectified," and the data
can only be kept for as long as is necessary to satisfy the purpose
for which the data was initially collected)0
Fourth, Article 7 of the EU Directive generally prohibits the
processing of data unless the data subject gives consent in an
unambiguous manner. There are exceptions to this, however.
Unambiguous consent is not needed under two circumstances: (1)
when the processing of data is necessary for "compliance with a
legal obligation" to "protect the vital interests of the data
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 5, art. 3(2).
27. Id. art. 4.
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subject.., for entering into or performing a contract with the data
subject," or (2) when the processing of data is "necessary for
performance of a task in the public interest.
31
Additionally, Articles 10, 11, and 12 refer to the subject's
right to know the identity of the collector of the information, and
the purpose for the collection of the information. Also, the subject
has a right to edit, erase, or intercept the processing of data that
fails to comply with EU Directive requirements.32
Article 25 is the most significant to the United States. As
stated in Article 25, transfer of personal data to a non-European
country may take place only if the country ensures an adequate
level of data protection.33 The EU and United States debate over
what constitutes adequate protection. The lack of comprehensive
national data privacy legislation in the United States and the ad
hoc nature of state privacy laws raise serious questions about
whether the transfer of data from EU member states to the United
States violates Article 25.14 "Where there is not adequate
protection, personal data transferred from [the EU] to the U.S. [is]
permitted only [by] one of the [narrow exceptions] in Article 26.""
Article 26 allows for exceptions, namely where the subject has
given unambiguous consent to the proposed transfer or where the
transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract made at the
subject's request. 36 The EU has adamantly voiced its concerns
regarding the adequacy of the level of data protection the United
States provides, and continues to apply consistent pressure on the
United States to enact more stringent privacy protection
regulation.37
31. Id. art. 7. Under Article 8, the EU Directive applies stricter consent rules to data
that reveals "racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs,
trade union membership" and data "concerning health or sex life." Id. art. 8.
32. See id. art. 10-12. In addition, if it does not require a "disproportionate" effort on
the part of the collector, the collector must notify third parties to whom data has been
disclosed or exchanged about any changes. Id. art. 12(c).
33. Id. art. 25. "This Article is designed to prevent the creation of data havens by
third countries that would frustrate the purpose of the Directive." TURKINGTON &
ALLEN, supra note 1, at 440.
34. See Scott Foster, Online Profiling is on the Rise: How Long Until the United States
and the European Union Lose Patience with Self-Regulation?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
255, 266 (2000).
35. Id.
36. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 5, art. 26.
37. See HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 36.
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C. The U.S. Approach to Online Data Protection
In contrast to the comprehensive EU approach, the
protection of information privacy in the United States is a
"fractured, episodic, recorded targeted patchwork of laws," 38 which
leaves the majority of computerized data without legal regulation.
To begin with, there is no precise constitutional guarantee of the
right to privacy in the United States.39  In addition, all
constitutional rights apply only against the government, not
private actors. ° Moreover, all of the federal and state privacy laws
and regulations currently in place apply only to specific categories
of information use.4' Furthermore, none of the laws currently in
effect are comprehensive enough to provide adequate
informational privacy across the board.42 Finally, although the
common law of privacy recognizes four basic types of privacy
rights under the law of torts, none of these tort actions really offer
43protection for informational privacy.
The U.S. response to the EU Directive was not the enactment
of comprehensive federal data privacy legislation, but rather the
creation of the ineffective international Safe Harbor Principles,
which require U.S. entities to voluntarily cooperate with the EU
Directive." The Safe Harbor framework is supposed to bridge the
38. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 1, at 336.
39. Anna E. Shimanek, Do You Want Milk With Those Cookies?: Complying with the
Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 26 J. CORP. L. 455, 465-66 (2001).
40. Id. at 466.
41. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 14. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (governs federal records systems); Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1998) (generally opens government records to the public, but contains
medical, personnel, and "similar files"); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §
1681 (2000) (governs access to records of an individual's movie video rentals); Privacy
Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (sets procedures for government access to
newspapers, records and information); Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998,
15 U.S.C. § 6501 (1998) (requires that Internet sites aimed at children under thirteen
receive "verifiable" parental consent for the child's use of the web site).
42. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 1, at 429.
43. See Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, Origins and Growth of U.S. Privacy Law, in
SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE
IN A HIGH-TECH & CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 9, 24 (Practising Law
Institute 2001). The common law recognizes rights against: (1) intrusion upon seclusion;
(2) publication of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity placing a person in a false light;
and (4) appropriation of name, likeness, and identity. Id.
44. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES,
available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm. (last visited
April 2, 2004).
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differences between the EU and U.S. approaches to privacy
protection.
Voluntary compliance with the Safe Harbor creates a
presumption of adequacy, and allows U.S. entities to be eligible to
receive personal data from EU member states. Compliance with
the Safe Harbor is satisfied where entities take one of the
following measures: (1) joining a self-regulatory privacy program
which adheres to the Safe Harbor, (2) developing self-regulatory
privacy policies which conform with the Safe Harbor, or (3) being
subject to other laws or rules which effectively protect personal
privacy.45 Thus, a U.S. entity's decision to comply with the
guidelines is voluntary. Once they choose to comply, they have the
option to self regulate, which gives them the leeway to enact low
standards.
Substantively, under the Safe Harbor framework,
organizations that decide, to participate in the program must
comply with the Safe Harbor's seven requirements , and publicly
declare that they do comply.47 First, "organization[s] must inform
individuals about the purposes for which it collects and uses
information about them, [and give information on] how to contact
the organization with any inquiries or complaints., 48 Also,
organizations must give individuals the opportunity to opt out
49
before their personal information is disclosed to a third party or
used for purposes other than those for which the information was
originally collected. Furthermore, individuals must be given the
opportunity to affirmatively or explicitly opt in5° where personal
information is sensitive.
Second, if an organization wants to transfer information to a
third party, it must either ensure that the third party subscribes to
the Safe Harbor, or that it is subject to the Directive, or some
other adequacy finding. It may also enter into a written agreement
with the third party requiring that the third party provide at least





49. "Opt out" means an entity can collect user information unless the user
affirmatively indicates that they do not want their information collected. Id.
50. "Opt in" means an entity must obtain consent from users before they can collect
information. Id.
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Harbor." Third, individuals must have access to any personal
information collected about them, and be able to "correct, amend,
or delete" information when inaccurate. 2
Fourth, organizations are required to take reasonable
precautions to protect an individual's data from "loss, misuse, and
unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.
5 3
Fifth, the Safe Harbor ambiguously states that "personal
information must be relevant for the purposes for which it is to be
54used," without clarifying what constitutes a relevant purpose.
Sixth, in terms of enforcement, the Safe Harbor requires: (1) a
"readily available and affordable independent recourse
mechanism,"55  (2) procedures for verifying organizations'
adherence to and implementation of the Safe Harbor, and (3) an
obligation to remedy non-compliance problems when they arise. 6
Seventh, organizations must self-certify annually with the
Department of Commerce by writing a consent agreement
adhering to the Safe Harbor requirements and publishing it in its
privacy policy statement. 7 In turn, the Department of Commerce
maintains a list of all organizations that file the self-certification
letters and make the letter, and a list of qualifying organizations,
publicly available on its official web site. 8 To date, 175 businesses
have voluntarily listed themselves on the Safe Harbor List,59 and
most of the businesses included are smaller businesses and not the
Fortune 500 companies that truly make an impact on the world
economy and international trade.
The Safe Harbor requirements fail to provide any kind of
comprehensive federal regulation. On the contrary, not only is the
decision to enter the Safe Harbor completely voluntary, the
majority of the regulation and enforcement aspects are carried out
51. Id.
52. Id. An exception is made where "the burden or expense of providing access would
be disproportionate to the risks to the individual's privacy in question," or where someone





57. SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW, supra note 7.
58. Id.
59. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor List available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
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by the private sector with federal enforcement supplied only on
rare occasions.60
III. OMNIBUS LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO ONLINE PRIVACY
CONERNS
A. Introduction
There is heated debate over how much regulation concerning
online privacy is actually needed. Privacy advocates argue that
self-regulation is inadequate due to the lack of enforcement
mechanisms and the scarcity of legal options for harmed
individuals. On the other hand, industry tends to rigidly favor self-
regulation. From the industry's point of view, self-regulation
results in efficient market-based solutions, while placing minimal
burdens on affected businesses. Therefore, both sides of the
debate merit attention.
B. Arguments for Comprehensive Regulation
As the overview on U.S. online privacy policies illustrate,
many consumer advocates suggest that some legislative action is
required to resolve the inconsistencies relating to privacy
protections on the Internet. There are strong advantages to
enacting comprehensive federal regulation similar to the EU
Directive.
First, U.S. state, federal, and constitutional law simply do not
speak to consumer privacy concerns against private actors in any
inclusive way. Although the patchwork approach does a decent job
of addressing specific categories of concerns regarding privacy, it
does not adequately protect consumers from "the aggressive data
gathering practices of online marketers. 6'
Therefore, privacy advocates argue, the only way to achieve
an acceptable level of protection for online consumers is for
Congress to create omnibus legislation that effectively secures
consumer privacy rights and clearly sets forth methods for
consumers to assert those rights.62
60. Id.
61. Shaun A. Sparks, The Direct Marketing Model and Virtual Identity: Why the
United States Should Not Create Legislative Controls on the Use of Online Consumer
Personal Data, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 517, 542 (2000).
62. Id.
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Second, the fact that the EU continues to voice its frustration
and concerns with the current U.S. standards may have dire
consequences for future U.S.-EU trade relations. EU officials have
explicitly made clear their view of the U.S. approach to private
data protection, stating that it is generally inadequate.
Furthermore, it has been a sticking point for long-running trade
negotiations between the United States and Europe."
EU data protection officials have some enforcement power
regarding international transfers of private information, and this
power includes the authority to block data exports by issuing a
data embargo order, thereby forbidding or limiting international
data export. Such an embargo would have immediate and wide-
ranging repercussions for U.S. businesses. Considering these
tensions, it would make sense to create a streamlined standard,
one that is acceptable for the United States and the EU, as well as
for the rest of the world.
Although the EU currently recognizes the Safe Harbor as
satisfying the data privacy requirements in the EU Directive, 65 it
has become increasingly clear that the EU does not see the Safe
Harbor as an adequate remedy to addressing consumer data
protection, and it is likely that they will eventually reject the Safe
Harbor in its current form. The European Commission's staff
working paper concerning the Safe Harbor issued on February 13,
2002, noted the EU's concern that many organizations claiming to
comply with the Safe Harbor are not "observing the expected
degree of transparency as regards their overall commitment or as
regards to the contents of their privacy policies."6
According to Professor Dr. Spiro Simitis, the EU may be
unwilling to compromise its concerns regarding data protection
because privacy is such a fundamental right in European countries.
63. Foster, supra note 34, at 266.
64. Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on
International Data Flows, 80 IOWA. L. REV. 471,488 (1995).
65. See SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW, supra note 7.
66. Commission Staff Working Paper: The Application of Commission Decision
520/2000/EC of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided by the Safe
Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, SEC (2002) 196, Feb. 13, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internalmarket/ en/dataport/adequacy/02-196_en.pdf.
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As Simitis stated, it is simply "not a subject you can bargain
about. ,
67
Another argument for comprehensive legislation is that it
increases electronic commerce by increasing consumer confidence
in how data is handled.6' Privacy advocates argue consumers will
feel more confident in conducting business over the Internet if
they know that their information is secure and protected.
Although assessing the validity of this argument is difficult, at a
minimum, there is overwhelming polling data that shows a
widespread concern about online data privacy. A 1995 Equifax
consumer survey revealed that 80 percent of "Americans agree
consumers have lost all control over how personal information
about them is circulated and used by companies., 69 Many people
who shy away from electronic commerce for privacy concern
reasons would likely otherwise engage in electronic commerce if
privacy standards were improved by comprehensive legislation.
Finally, as the Federal Trade Commission's May 2000 Privacy
Report illustrates (2000 FTC Report),7 ° the U.S. self-regulation
approach is failing in its current form. According to the survey
taken by the FTC, in a random sample of 335 web sites collecting
personal information, only 20 percent of web sites implemented all
of the fair information practice principles." This is common under
the current Safe Harbor framework, since most of the enforcement
is carried out by the private sector itself. Thus, there is little
incentive for companies to comply with the standards set forth in
the Safe Harbor Principles.
Although the FTC has the power to seek injunctive relief and
civil penalties against a private entity which fails to abide by the
Safe Harbor, it is clearly not enough of a threat to make these
private entities comply with those standards in any significant
way.72 Furthermore, there have been very limited instances where
the FTC has actually punished private entities for noncompliance.
67. Fred Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public
Interest, 80 IOWA L.R. 431, 439 (1995) (quoting Spiros Simitis, Unpubished Comments at
the Annenberg Conference on Information Privacy and the Public Interest (Oct. 6, 1994)).
68. SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 17, at 79.
69. Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES AND ALAN F. WESTIN, EQUIFAX-HARRIS
CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY 1995.
70. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS,
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C. Arguments Against Comprehensive Regulation
On the other end of the spectrum, the market model, or the
self-regulation model, defers to the free market to resolve these
tensions concerning data privacy.73 Market model advocates urge
Congress to allow businesses to sort out the privacy issue on their
own terms and in their own ways.74 The FTC has basically
encouraged a self-regulation approach to online consumer
privacy. Advocates of the market model approach argue that
consumers will be concerned about online privacy issues as they
become increasingly aware of the problem, and the private sector
will eventually respond to these concerns because it will be
essential for them to do so if they want to maintain their consumer
base.76
Under the self-regulation model, "the incentives for industry
to protect privacy are entirely financial. 7 7 The idea behind the
self-regulation model is that consumers have the power to
negotiate what information they wish to disclose to web sites.78 If
consumers care about privacy they will force industry to provide it
since "bad publicity about [a] company's privacy practices can
detract from the company's total reputation for quality., 79 In this
sense, proponents of the market model assert that comprehensive
consumer privacy regulation is unnecessary because the market
will eventually work itself out.
Proponents of the market model also point out the legitimate
and appropriate uses for data gathered through the Internet. One
argument is that technology related to online profiling enhances
and facilitates electronic commerce. For instance, cookies, small
files that a web site's host computer places on a visitor's hard
drive, 80 allow a web site to remember information provided by the
73. JOHN T. NOCKLEBY, DATA PROFILING INTRODUCTION, at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/privacy/Module2_Intro.html (last visited April 20, 2004).
74. Robert O'Harrow Jr., Survey of Web Finds Gains on Privacy Issues, WASH.
POST, Mar. 28, 2002, at E2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com.
75. Foster, supra note 34, at 266.
76. Id. at 267.
77. Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the
Protection of Personal Information, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/
selfregl.htm (Sept. 8, 1997).
78. NOCKLEBY, supra note 73.
79. Swire, supra note 77.
80. "Cookies" are a mechanism that allows a web server to save small packets of data
called cookies in a visitor's web browser. The cookie returns with the request each time
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visitor, such as her password, email address, credit card number,
and mailing address.' This means that a consumer will not have to
reenter the data on her next visit, saving her time and needless
hassle .
Additionally, cookies can also be used to track a consumer's
purchasing habit, monitor the pages on a site they view, monitor
viewing duration, and learn other information about a consumer's
preferences while they surf on the web. 3 Web sites commonly
collect information such as a user's social security number, age,
sex, date of birth, shopping preferences, health information,
financial information, martial status, and hobbies, in order to
compile this information into comprehensive user profiles.84 This
information can then be used to customize a site with a consumer's
preferences, and offer shoppers suggestions consistent with their
needs and tastes. 5
Accordingly, there are cost and time efficiency benefits to
data collection by web sites when used to customize or personalize
consumer needs. The warehousing of personal information in the
hands of trustworthy third parties can dramatically simplify
electronic commerce transactions for the user.
Finally, proponents of the market model point out that
privacy concerns about online profiling and other Internet-based
data gathering are still very vague, and have not been clearly
identified. Consequently, these proponents argue that it would be
premature to enact any kind of comprehensive regulation
86concerning consumer data privacy. As one commentator points
the visitor accesses the same web site. Cookies can be used to maintain a list of items a
customer has purchased, to store user preferences, or as a means to track the pattern of a
visitor's behavior when visiting a web site. Most browsers allow users to disable cookies,
however, disabling cookies denies access to some web sites. Charles L. Kerr & Oliver
Metzger, Online Privacy: Emerging Issues, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, FIRST
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A
HIGH TECH & CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 29,61 (2000).
81. Rita Heimes, Internet Privacy Law, Policy, and Practice: State, Federal, and
International Perspectives, 54 ME. L. REV. 95, 95 (2002).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, PRIVACY AND CONSUMER
PROFILING, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling (Oct. 8,2003).
85. Heimes, supra note 81, at 95.
86. See Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the
Costs of Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV., at
10 (2000), at http://stlr.standford.edu/STLR/articles/00 stir_2.
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out, there is currently a "remarkable coming together of various
forces pushing for extreme solutions to vaguely identified
problems at unknown costs. '87 For instance, in the 2000 FTC
Report, the FTC noted "significant consumer privacy concerns"
arising from "the prevalence, ease, and relatively low cost" of
gathering and processing personal data, and conceded that self-
regulation was inadequate to address online privacy issues."" In
response, the FTC dramatically reversed its prior favorable
position on self-regulation and called for federal comprehensive
privacy legislation. In the 2000 FTC Report, however, there is
absolutely no consideration for costs and benefits of any proposed
regulation, nor is there any explanation as to how this unclear and
overbroad mandate will be enforced.90
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether it is necessary to
make a distinction between online and offline privacy concerns
and regulations. For instance, catalog companies and supermarket
price clubs have mined data contained in consumer responses to
surveys and purchases for years without regulation. 9' What is the
difference between mining information through surveys and
purchases, and mining for data through online profiling
mechanisms? First, some argue that there is a difference between
online and offline data collection, because the Internet facilitates
the ability to "create a digital trail like nothing we've had so far in
history. '"9 Online data collection involves the accumulation of
incomprehensible volumes of information at amazing speeds. The
sheer volume, speed, and flexibility of the gathered and processed
data is what distinguishes it from its offline counterpart. Second,
the "surveillance of users on the Internet is cheap, and its product
(profiles) is extremely valuable." 93 Accordingly, there is more
economic incentive to engage in online data profiling and
collection, and thus, "what might have been economically justified
only for targets of extraordinary investigations is now justified for
87. Id. at 1 12.
88. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 70, at 33.
89. Marsha Cope Huie et al., The Right to Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods
the U.S. and Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 391, 396 (2002).
90. Walker, supra note 86, 10.
91. NOCKLEBY, supra note 73.
92. Edward C. Baig et al., Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal Info. What's in
it for You?, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 1999, at 84 (quoting Constance E. Bagley).
93. Lawrence Jenab, Will the Cookie Crumble?: An Analysis of Internet Privacy
Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106 Congress, 49 KAN. L. REV. 641, 673 (2001).
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the average Jane." 94 This unprecedented circumstance certainly
constitutes a qualitatively and quantitatively different threat to
consumer privacy than offline modes of data profiling and data
mining, however, it is not completely clear whether offline laws are
inadequate to regulate online data gathering activity.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
A. Proposal for an Alternative Approach
There are many viable arguments for and against instituting
comprehensive federal regulation to address online privacy
concerns. Even assuming that proponents of the market model are
correct in relying on the theory that market pressures will
eventually force the market to address consumer privacy concerns,
there is empirical evidence that shows that the self-regulation
model in its current form is inadequate in the United States. To
date, only 175 businesses have voluntarily listed themselves on the
Safe Harbor List,95 and according to the 2000 FTC Report,96 the
majority of those businesses are not in complete compliance with
the standards set forth in the Safe Harbor.
Article 25 of the EU Directive, which requires adequate
protection before data can be transferred from EU countries to
the United States, highlights the necessity of consistency between
national laws in this area. The global nature of data transmissions
made over the Internet and other digital networks have made
privacy interests internationally relevant.98 The current debate
between the EU and United States over data privacy concerns
suggests that the solution to the current dilemma is the creation of
an international standard for information privacy. Consumers and
service providers need a universally consistent standard. It is
apparent that the lack of an international consensus on data
privacy protection has serious costs and risks. As one scholar
pointed out, "the lack of common principles burdens information
users, compromises privacy protection for individuals, requires
94. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1261-63 (1998).
95. Safe Harbor List, supra note 59.
96. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 70, at 12.
97. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 5, art. 25.
98. CATE, supra note 15, at 126.
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greater national bureaucracies to administer national laws in
multinational contexts, and threatens the deployment of new and
valued services." 99
Comprehensive legislation such as the EU Directive is not an
adequate solution either. Effective international online consumer
privacy legislation must take the realities of the Internet into
account. As discussed earlier, the laws of economics are at work.
Information cheaply and quickly collected on the Internet through
online profiling and other online data gathering mechanisms has
value, and like any other valuable commodity, will be bought and
sold.'0 Furthermore, recognizing the idiosyncratic nature of the
Internet is imperative. The decentralized nature of the Internet
makes any type of comprehensive legislation very difficult to
implement and to enforce; 1 however, effective legislation cannot
be completely self-regulatory.
In the domestic forum, it is inevitable that mounting public
perceptions of online privacy risks will increase demand for federal
regulation. Internationally, it is inevitable that global pressures,
spearheaded by the European Community, will continue and may
eventually lead to the adoption of some kind of international
privacy standard. These concerns illustrate the need for a new
international model of online data protection legislation that takes
a middle ground approach between consumer concerns and
market model concerns. This proposed legislation, based on a
consumerist model, balances the consumer interests of privacy and
anonymity with the commercial interest in commodifying personal
information. °2
The following sections of this Comment will present some of
the principles discussed in the Safe Harbor, and recommend ways
in which it can be modified or supplemented to better address
global and domestic consumer concerns regarding online privacy.
The sections will also explore ways in which the market demands
for the commercial accumulation and sale of online data can be
simultaneously satisfied. The final section of this Comment will
discuss how this proposed paradigm for international data privacy
legislation can be effectively implemented and enforced.
99. Id. at 129.
100. HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 23-24.
101. Id. at 37.
102. NOCKLEBY, supra note 73.
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B. The Consumerist Model Approach
The current Safe Harbor does not weigh consumer privacy
concerns heavily enough. Accordingly, effective international
online privacy legislation based on the consumerist approach
requires the augmentation of five of the seven principles currently
included in the Safe Harbor: notice, choice, onward transfer,
access, and security.
1. Notice
A survey of over 1,400 web sites contained within the FTC's
June 1998 Report to Congress (1998 FTC Report) 3 revealed that
efforts to encourage voluntary adoption of basic and fair notice
practices within the industry are failing. The FTC's survey shows
that the vast majority of web sites collect personal information
from consumers, yet only 14 percent of those web sites provide any
kind of notice to consumers with respect to their information
practices, and only two percent of those web sites "provide notice
by means of a comprehensive privacy policy". 1°4 Although some
companies back up their privacy statements with Seal Programs,
such as TRUSTe or BBBonline (which hold web sites to some
kind of baseline standard) the standards are minimal and it is
questionable if these programs are truly effective.'5 This is a clear
indication that the current Safe Harbor Principles' notice
requirement is ineffective.
A consumerist model focuses on providing adequate notice to
a consumer when online profiling is occurring. Within the
consumerist model, debates take place over what constitutes
adequate notice.' °  There are three approaches to notice. One
approach is to require organizations to post clear and conspicuous
notice regarding their data collection and disclosure practices. A
103. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ii-
iii (June 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf.
104. Id. at iii.
105. Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF's Top 12 Ways to Protect Your Online
Privacy, (Apr. 10, 2002), available at http://www.eff.orgPrivacy/eff-privacy-top-12.html.
"TRUSTe" is a non-profit organization that provides monitoring and periodic reviews of
over 1600 licensee web sites with regard to privacy; similarly, "BBBonline," a subsidiary of
the Council of Better Business Bureaus, also provides monitoring of over 600 participant
web sites to ensure compliance. BBBOnline, at http://www.bbbonline.com/consumer (last
visited Feb. 3, 2004); Kerr & Metzger, supra note 80, at 38.
106. NOCKLEBY, supra note 73.
107. Jenab, supra note 93, at 673.
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second approach is to require notice only after the data has been
collected, allowing organizations to collect data without the
consumer's knowledge. The third approach is to make the notice
requirement very flexible, and provide individual organizations
with the choice to decide what kind of notice they want to provide
to their consumers based on their underlying policies.'0 9
The problem with all three current approaches to notice
stems from the fact that there are no existing comprehensive
standards, and the policy statements, if any are even provided, are
confusing. The 2000 FTC Report noted that many web sites
describe their policy in very general terms, then reveal exceptions
to the general rule somewhere later in the same statement. This
can be extremely misleading to consumers.110 Web companies
know consumers rarely read or understand their so-called privacy
policies. These policies are inundated with legalese and impossible
for the average consumer to understand.' A policy statement is
useless and inadequate if it does not actually inform and advise the
consumer.
Accordingly, it would make sense to create an international
comprehensive notice standard that lays out exactly what must be
included in a policy statement. Then organizations will be clear on
what is required of them, and consumers have the opportunity to
learn about the collection practices of an organization before
deciding if they want to provide the organization with their
information.
First, a privacy statement should list all information collected
by the web site (e.g., purchases, surveys and polls, data collected at
registration) and the collection or storage of that that information.
If the site collects tracking data, that should also be disclosed.
Next, the policy statement should describe how the collected
information is actually used (e.g., to complete a customer's
registration, to send the user e-mail notices, to mine purchase
preferences of a consumer). If the site supplies this information to
third parties, even if the third party is an affiliate or co-brander,
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 70, at 24-25.
111. Paul Eng, Privacy on the Web: Will New Standards and Laws Help Protect
Sensitive User Data?, ABC NEWS, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/
webprivacy020730.html (July 30, 2003).
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the consumer should be notified of that practice and that web site
should identify those third parties.
Third, the policy statement should include information on
how to contact the organization if the user or consumer has any
questions or problems. It should also explain how and to what
extent the individual may limit the collection or use of their
information. For instance, if the web site uses cookies or web
bugs'12 to collect the information, the statement should describe
what cookies and web bugs do, and include instructions on how to
disable them, if possible."
Finally, if web sites reserve the right to change their policy in
the future, they should be required to notify consumers of any
material changes in their data collection policy, and should be
disallowed from applying new policies to previously collected
information. In addition, it should be further mandated that the
policy statement be posted somewhere on the web site where it is
easily seen and accessible to visitors
2. Choice
Currently, the Safe Harbor requires an organization to give
individuals the choice to opt out if their information will be
disclosed to third parties (who can then use it for purposes
incompatible with those for which it was originally collected); or
opt in if their sensitive information will be disclosed to third.. 114
parties. This opt in versus opt out approach has dominated the
debate over choice. Under an opt out approach, the collection and
circulation of the user's information is acceptable, unless the user
affirmatively indicates a rejection of that policy. On the other
112. "Web bugs," also known as "invisible gif" or a "1 x 1 gif," is an "image that is
added to a web page that is located on a different site to inform the party running the site
each time the page is downloaded. Web bugs are frequently used by advertising networks
such as DoubleClick to measure the number of times a page containing an advertisement
is downloaded." It can also be used to track a user from one site to another by recording
the IP address from which the request is received. Phillip Hallam-Baker & Stephen S. Wu,
An Introduction to Privacy Technologies and Techno-Speak, in PRACITISING LAW
INSTITUTE, SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL
COMPLIANCE IN A HIGH-TECH & CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 89, 106-07
(2001).
113. You can block third-party cookies by using programs like "Cookie Crusher" or by
setting your browser to override automatic cookie handling. Daniel Tynan, How to Take
Back Your Privacy, PC WORLD (June 2002) at http://www.pcworld.com/resource/
printable/ article/O,aid,92895,00.asp.
114. SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW, supra note 7.
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hand, under an opt in approach, companies must obtain a user's
permission before collecting and using any personal information
from a user. An August 2000 survey revealed that 86 percent of
Internet users favored an opt in privacy policy.
11 5
Any comprehensive international policy on the issue of choice
should apply to both the collection of information and its
disclosure (to any third parties). Furthermore, it should prohibit
the collection and disclosure of all information unless the entity
obtains affirmative consent in advance, which would take form of
an opt in approach. The problem with the Safe Harbor's choice
standard is that it tries to differentiate between sensitive and non-
sensitive data without adequately defining those terms. Similarly,
the EU Directive generally prohibits the collection or use of data
identifying "racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs [and data] concerning health or sex life." The
EU directive requires that consumers have an opt in option for the
data collection and processing activities applicable to this type of
information only.' 6 There is no consensus to date as to what
constitutes sensitive information since the definition appears to
depend on personal preferences. 117
Rather than applying different standards for different types of
information, it would make more sense to require an opt in choice
for the collection and disclosure of all information. This seems to
reflect the wishes of the majority of consumers. In practical
terms, an opt in requirement would mean that web sites would be
required to leave permission boxes unchecked. Alternatively, the
boxes that prohibit the collection and distribution of personal
information should be pre-checked." 9
The more complex question regarding choice understands the
broad definition of the term. Does the right to choice mean that
consumers should simply be given a mechanism whereby they may
either grant or refuse permission for online profiling activity, and
be afforded the opportunity to exit the site before the fact of their
115. Dylan Tweney, The Rules for Writing a Privacy Policy (Sept. 7, 2000), at
http://www.ecompany.com/articles/web/0,1653,8297,00.html.
116. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 5, art. 8.
117. Walker, supra note 86, 158 (citing CATE, supra note 15, at 117-18).
118. Tweney, supra note 115 (86% of Internet users favor an "opt in" privacy policy
program).
119. An example of this is a check box that says, "No, you may not collect and sell my
personal data to any other businesses."
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visit becomes a part of their profile? Or does it encompass a
broader right, whereby consumers may still- obtain the same
benefits whether or not they consent or refuse the collection and
distribution of data? Self-regulation advocates argue that
consumers who object to data collection should not have a "legally
guaranteed right to 'free ride' on possible value and corresponding
benefits made possible by the cooperation of those who do not
object. 2°
The former right appears more in tune with the objective of
the choice requirement and is consistent with the protection of
public interests. It should be legal to reward users who consent to
have their computer usage monitored in exchange for certain
benefits. If a vendor wants to offer lower prices in exchange for
this information, they should have the right to do so. Supermarket
club or loyalty programs have applied the same standard for years.
Supermarkets issue cards offering discounts for certain specially
priced items exclusively available for their members in exchange
for the collection of useful data such as purchasing habits and
patterns, without extending those prices to customers who decline
to use the card and have their information collected.12' There is no
regulation that prevents supermarkets from sharing the
information that they collect with third parties. Choice simply
means that consumers should have an opportunity to decide
whether they want to be profiled or not. It should not encompass
any rights beyond that, and any comprehensive regulation should
reflect that notion.
3. Onward Transfer
Onward transfer of data to third parties is the practice of
vendors selling or transferring information to third party recipients
or buyers. Any comprehensive international legislation will have
to ensure that third party recipients or buyers of information also
120. Walker, supra note 86, 1 153 (citing Statement of FTC Commissioner Thomas B.
Leary Re: The Federal Trade Commission's May 2000 Report to Congress on Online
Privacy Before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation (May 25, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2000/07onlineprofiling.htm#LEARY [hereinafter Statement of FTC Commissioner
Thomas B. Leary]).
121. See NOCKLEBY, supra note 73.
122. See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 84.
123. See SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW, supra note 7.
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conform to the same policies on notice and choice as described in
the previous sections. There is the potential for abuse when private
information is transferred to third parties. For example, when
online consumer health site, DrKoop.com, went bankrupt in 2002,
the company tried to sell their customer information to a similar
type of web site called Vitacost.com. 124 The problem was that
nearly one million visitors of DrKoop.com entered their personal
and medical histories on the site, believing that such data would
remain private.'2 Although the filing of a suit prevented
DrKoop.com from selling medical information, this illustrates
126what could happen if onward transfer policies are too lax.
The Safe Harbor includes a requirement that third party
recipients of information apply the notice and choice principles of
the Safe Harbor. 27 This requirement, however, becomes somewhat
more complex in an international setting. As with Article 25 of the
EU Directive, any multinational legislation would have to include
a provision that provides that transfers to a third country be
dependent on an adequate level of protection of data privacy by
that third country. The Safe Harbor notes, however, that "[i]t is
not necessary to provide notice or choice when disclosure is made
to a third party that is acting as an agent to perform task(s) on
behalf of and under the instructions of the organization.
' 28
The Safe Harbor sets out reasonable requirements for the
onward transfer of data to third party agents. Where an
organization wishes to transfer information to a third party that is
acting as an agent, vendor, contractor, or consultant, it should be
adequate that the third party complies with the standards set forth
by the primary party, so long as that information is being used
within the intended scope of the transaction. 9 Otherwise, it would
be too difficult and costly for vendors to conduct business over the
Internet. For example, it would make no sense to require FedEx
workers to review and comply with different customer privacy
124. Eng, supra note 111.
125. Id.
126. In the end, Vitacost.com was only allowed to buy the DrKoop.com web site, its
trademark, and the e-mail addresses of former DrKoop.com members. Id.
127. Safe Harbor Principle, supra note 44.
128. Id.
129. SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW, supra note 7.
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policies for different deliveries depending on the policy of the
Internet vendor that took the order. 1
4. Access
The access requirement in the Safe Harbor clearly states that
consumers should have the right to "correct, amend, or delete that
information where it is inaccurate."'31 The practical question is
how much access is enough. Certainly, the same degree of access is
not appropriate for all types of information. For instance,
information used as a basis for granting credit or employment is
much more important than information gathered for a consumer
survey. As the Safe Harbor notes, burden and expense should be
important, although not dispositive, factors to be taken into
account in considering how much access should be granted.'32
International standards must also take burden and expense into
consideration and apply a principle of reasonableness and
proportionality. As Commissioner Thomas Leary of the FTC
explains, a broad application of the access requirement could in
many cases, lead to vast expense for trivial benefit.'33 It would
make sense to apply different standards of access depending on
the sensitivity of the information collected and the purposes for
which it is gathered.
5. Security
There is no way to absolutely guarantee the security of
personal information provided by consumers to a web site. There
has recently been a string of successful hacks into major
commercial and governmental web sites.13 The reality is that "the
Internet is the most surveillance-friendly environment there is,"
which means that there are ample opportunities for security
breaches."3 In addition to hackings, information leaks and
130. See Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 44.
131. Id.
132. SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW, supra note 7.
133. Statement of FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary, supra note 120.
134. John B. Kennedy & Matthew H. Meade, Privacy Policies and Fair Information
Practices: A Look at Current Issues Regarding Online Consumer Privacy and Business
Practices, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY
LAW: STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A HIGH-TECH & CHANGING
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 321,341 (2001).
135. Doug Bedell, Many Find it's Hard to Hide from Trackers in Cyberspace, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 2,2002, at C-1.
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technical glitches are also commonplace.136 For instance, in
November 2002, a glitch on the Victoria's Secret web site allowed
people to view details of customer's private purchases and
customer's name, address, and size.137 The order status features on
the Victoriassecret.com web site was temporarily shut down while
company officials investigated the problem and fixed the glitch.
38
Consistent with the Safe Harbor, the future international
legislation can require organizations to take reasonable
precautions to protect personal information from "loss, misuse and
unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.' '139 In
the United States, consumers already have the right to sue an
organization whose system is hacked by alleging either negligence
or the web site's failure to provide adequate security measures.
The threat of legal action, coupled with the adverse effects of
negative publicity generated by a breach in security, is the real
incentive for meaningful security to any organization.
In addition to the requirement of adequate precautions, it
would make sense to require organizations to disclose the security
procedures that they choose to employ. For instance, many web
sites use encryption packages to secure their sites, which require
updates on the encryption programs as technology advances.
Organizations should be required to disclose what encryption
packages they use and to note any material changes in encryption
features. This will give consumers an opportunity to decide
whether they feel the security measures taken by a web site are
adequate before deciding whether they want to consent to the
collection of their data.
C. Implementation and Enforcement
The current debate between Europe and the United States
regarding the application of the EU Directive illustrates the need
for an international standard for information privacy-the
challenge is the implementation and enforcement of legislation.
The implementation of an international standard is possible,
136. See id.
137. Bob Sullivan, Victoria's Secret Customers Exposed: Glitch at Web Site Reveals
Who Ordered What in Some Cases, MSNBC NEWS, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/
840596.asp?Ocv=CB10 (Nov. 27, 2002).
138. Id.
139. Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 44.
140. Walker, supra note 86, 171.
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
however. As noted earlier, Europe and the United States already
share many basic principles underlying information privacy
contained within the EU Directive and the Safe Harbor. Where
the EU and the United States diverge most sharply is on the role
of the government in protecting privacy.14' As discussed earlier, the
EU member states believe that government should oversee the
data processing activities of private parties and enforce the law
when necessary. The United States, on the other hand, backs a
142self-regulatory scheme. In light of the apparent failure of the
U.S. self-regulation scheme, it is time for the U.S. government to
take a more active role in overseeing data processing activities and
enforcing privacy laws.
At a minimum, the U.S. government should articulate
domestic principles for information privacy. In the end, it should
work with other countries towards promulgating basic,
multinational principles on privacy and data protection. The
creation and implementation of international privacy protection
legislation, like the legislation proposed here, will not be easy.
[Any such legislation will have to take into account the fact that
different countries assign value to privacy in varying ways and how
these unique systems will affect the overall market and economy.]
In light of the proliferation of computers, networks, the Internet,
and the increase in electronic data exchange, it is inevitable that
concerns about digital data will eventually lead to the creation of
an international standard for privacy protection.
In addition, the failure of the self-regulation model in the
United States can be partially attributed to the fact that there are
no adequate dispute resolution bodies in place under the Safe
Harbor framework to effectively and efficiently resolve problems
that arise,'143 and the FTC appears to lack "the statutory authority,
the resources, and the reporting requirements that are required to
operate effectively on privacy issues."'1" Although the FTC is
141. HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 130.
142. Id.
143. Currently, the Deptartment of Commerce has chosen six organizations to operate
as dispute resolution bodies: BBBOnline, TRUSTe, the Direct Marketing Safe Harbour
Program, Entertainment Software Rating Board Privacy Online EU Safe Harbour
Programme, the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service, and the American
Arbitration Association. Application of 520/2000/EC, supra note 66.
144. Marc Rotenberg, Consumer Privacy in the E-Commerce Marketplace, in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW:
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under-equipped, it does have resources at its disposal to take
action against companies in violation of the Safe Harbor
requirements. The FTC's strongest weapon is Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), , which protects a
consumer's informational privacy when "a company collects or
disseminates personal data in an unfair or deceptive manner.
146
For example, in 1998, the FTC brought its first online privacy case
against GeoCities47 for misleading its members on how the
company used the information it gathered. In its complaint, the
FTC alleged that GeoCities falsely represented that the mandatory
information that members provided would not be released to third
parties without their consent, when in fact a third party collected
118
and maintained that information. In the end, the FTC was
successful in persuading GeoCities to prominently disclose what
information it was collecting, for what purpose, to whom it was to
be disclosed, and how members could inspect or remove their
personal information from the databases of third parties.
149
Although the FTC was successful in its suit against Geocities,
there are simply "too many complaints, too little adjudication, and
too little oversight" for the FTC to handle enforcement effectively
at this point.5 In addition, Section 5 of the FTCA simply does not
provide the FTC with jurisdiction to enforce the Safe Harbor. By
its own terms, Section 5 establishes extensive exceptions to the
FTC's authority over unfair or deceptive acts or practices with
respect to financial institutions, telecommunications and interstate
transportation common carriers, air carriers, packers, and
stockyard operators.' For instance, in January 2000, DoubleClick,
the world's largest provider of Internet-based advertising, was
sued in a series of lawsuits that challenged DoubleClick's effort to
STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A HIGH-TECH & CHANGING REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT 303, 311 (2001).
145. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
146. Complaint, In the Matter of GeoCities, No. C-3850, 1999 WL 69866 (F.T.C.).
147. Debra A. Valentine, Privacy on the Internet: The Evolving Legal Landscape,
Remarks Before Santa Clara University (Feb. 11, 2000), available at 2000 WL 222524
(F.T.C.).
148. GeoCities, 1999 WL 69866.
149. Valentine, supra note 147.
150. Rotenberg, supra note 144, at 311.
151. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW: FEDERAL AND
STATE "UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES" AUTHORITY AND PRIVACY, at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ENFORCEMENTOVERVIEWFINAL.htm (last
visited July 14, 2000).
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tie its database of customers' offline purchasing histories with
customers' online activities. 52 Although the FTC initially launched
an inquiry into DoubleClick's business practices, the FTC
eventually closed its investigation, acknowledging that
DoubleClick's practices were legitimate under the current lenient
privacy law standards.'53  As illustrated here, effectively
implementing international privacy legislation requires the FTC to
have more authority to execute and enforce the legislation. The
FTC must have the ability to send the message that there are real
penalties for violating privacy policy agreements, and that the FTC
has the power to sanction organizations when they are in violation.
V. CONCLUSION
The policy statement posted on the FTC's web site poignantly
summarizes the current dilemma facing the topic of online privacy:
[Aldvances in computer technology have made it possible for
detailed information about people to be compiled and shared
more easily and cheaply than ever. That has produced many
benefits for society as a whole and individual consumers.... At
the same time, as personal information becomes more
accessible, each of us-companies, associations, government
agencies, and consumers-must take precautions to protect
against the misuse of our information.1
4
It remains to be seen what kind of precautionary measures
the FTC is willing to take in the future to ensure against misuse
and abuse of information. It is clear that there is a dire need for
comprehensive, multinational legislation that addresses online
data privacy concerns. As the FTC has conceded, the U.S. self-
regulation model has failed in its current form and the EU places
increasing pressure on the U.S. government to get involved in the
creation and implementation of a standard that is comparable to
the EU Directive. Effective online privacy legislation must address
both consumer privacy concerns and market interests in the
commercial accumulation and sale of online data. The current U.S.
Safe Harbor Principles can meet both of these demands through
152. Charles L. Kerr & Oliver Metzger, Online Privacy: Current Developments in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, REPRESENTING TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES IN THE NEW
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 563,683 (PLI 2001).
1.53. Id.
154. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY INITIATIVES INTRODUCTION (2004),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy.
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modification and supplementation. Recalibration and modification
of the principles based on consumerist principles can create a
cohesive template for international privacy legislation.
Joann M. Wakana*
* J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2004; B.A. Political Science,
University of California at Los Angeles, 2000. I dedicate this Comment to my partents and
Jenny for all of their love and encouragement. Thanks especially to Jason for his support
throughout law school. Special thanks to Professor John Nockleby for bringing much
needed perspective to my Comment and for his invaluable input. Finally, I am grateful to
all of the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Review for their tireless assistance in preparing this Comment for publication.
2003]

